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TAKING IT WITH YOU: PLATFORM 




Policymakers are faced with a vexing problem: how to increase 
competition in a tech sector dominated by a few giants. One answer 
proposed and adopted by regulators in the United States and abroad is 
to require large platforms to allow consumers to move their data from 
one platform to another, an approach known as data portability.
Facebook, Google, Apple, and other major tech companies have 
enthusiastically supported data portability through their own technical 
and political initiatives. Today, data portability has taken hold as one 
of the go-to solutions to address the tech industry’s competition 
concerns.
This Article argues that despite the regulatory and industry 
alliance around data portability, today’s public and private data 
portability efforts are unlikely to meaningfully improve competition. 
This is because current portability efforts focus solely on mitigating 
switching costs, ignoring other barriers to entry that may preclude new 
platforms from entering the market. The technical implementations of 
data portability encouraged by existing regulation—namely one-off 
exports and API interoperability—address switching costs but not the 
barriers of network effects, unique data access, and economies of 
scale. This Article proposes a new approach to better alleviate these 
other barriers called collective portability, which would allow groups 
of users to coordinate to transfer data they share to a new platform, all 
at once. Although not a panacea, collective portability would provide a 
meaningful alternative to existing approaches while avoiding both the 
privacy/competitive utility trade off of one-off exports and the hard-to-
regulate power dynamics of APIs.
* Gabriel Nicholas is a Joint Research Fellow at New York University School of Law 
Information Law Institute and the New York University Center for Cybersecurity, and a Fel-
low at the Engelberg Center on Innovation Law & Policy. Thanks to Katherine Strandburg, 
Aaron Shapiro, Mark Verstraete, Salome Viljoen, Randy Milch, Carrie Brown, and Lucas 
Daniel Cuatrecasas for their sage guidance. Thank you also to the Yale Law School Infor-
mation Society Project conference on Big Tech and Antitrust and the NYU School of Law 
Privacy Research Group for helping me refine these ideas. Finally, special thanks to Michael 
Weinberg for introducing me to this topic.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 30, 2019, in response to fomenting anti-Facebook sentiment, 
Mark Zuckerberg released an op-ed titled, “Four Ideas to Regulate the In-
ternet.”
1
His first three ideas regarded speech, political advertisements, and 
privacy. The fourth addressed concerns that Facebook and its ilk had grown 
too large for any other platform to compete.
2
Zuckerberg called for regula-
1. Mark Zuckerberg, The Internet Needs New Rules, Let’s Start in These Four Areas,
WASH. POST (Mar. 30, 2019, 3:00 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mark-
zuckerberg-the-internet-needs-new-rules-lets-start-in-these-four-areas/2019/03/29/9e6f0504-
521a-11e9-a3f7-78b7525a8d5f_story.html.
2. See, e.g., Lina Khan, Amazon’s Antitrust Paradox, 126 YALE L.J. 710 (2017); Rob-
ert Reich, Break up Facebook (and While We’re at It, Google, Apple and Amazon),
GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2018, 3:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018
/nov/20/facebook-google-antitrust-laws-gilded-age; Joe Nocera, Easiest Fix for Facebook: 
Break It up, BLOOMBERG (Nov. 21, 2018, 11:44 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion
/articles/2018-11-21/fix-facebook-by-breaking-it-up-under-antitrust-regulation.
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tion to guarantee the principal of data portability, noting that, “[i]f you share 
data with one service, you should be able to move it to another. This gives 
people choice and enables developers to innovate and compete.”
3
Zuckerberg’s op-ed signaled a strategic shift in Facebook’s public poli-
cy strategy. Instead of fighting to keep Facebook data within the walls of the 
platform,
4
Facebook would allow for “data portability”—the ability for us-
ers to move their data from one service to another. It was an instrument of 
self-regulation that responded directly to mounting calls for antitrust action.
5
In the same way that the free movement of capital allows for competitive 
markets, so too would the free movement of data allow for competitive plat-
forms, at least in theory.
6
Facebook was not alone in adopting this ap-
proach—Apple, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter all included data portability 
in their competition policy efforts.
7
Data portability was also part of the 
ACCESS Act,
8
introduced by Senators Warner, Hawley, and Blumenthal 
seven months after Zuckerberg’s op-ed, to improve competition in the tech 
sector.
9
Although data portability laws already exist in California, the European 
Union, and Singapore,
10
they are not primarily aimed at improving tech sec-
3. Zuckerberg, supra note 1.
4. See generally Mark Andrejevic, Privacy, Exploitation, and the Digital Enclosure, 1 
AMSTERDAM L.F. 47 (2009); Kevin Bankston, How We Can ‘Free’ Our Facebook Friends,
NEW AMERICA (June 28, 2018), https://www.newamerica.org/weekly/edition-211/how-we-
can-free-our-facebook-friends.
5. Recent antitrust stirrings indicate that the government is interested in increasing 
competition among tech companies, particularly Alphabet, Amazon, Facebook, and Apple, 
which are all facing antitrust scrutiny by the Justice Department and other federal and state 
organizations. See Daisuke Wakabayashi et al., 16 Ways Facebook, Google, Apple and Ama-
zon Are in Government Cross Hairs, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 9, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com
/interactive/2019/technology/tech-investigations.html.
6. See generally VICTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & THOMAS RAMGE, REINVENTING 
CAPITALISM IN THE AGE OF BIG DATA (2018); Peter Swire, Markets, Self-Regulation, and 
Government Enforcement in the Protection of Personal Information, in Privacy and Self-
Regulation in the Information Age, DEP’T OF COM. (June 1997), https://papers.ssrn.com
/abstract=11472.
7. The Data Transfer Project is a joint framework intended to make it easier for com-
panies to let users port their data between. It is an open source project being led by Apple, 
Facebook, Google, Microsoft, and Twitter. See generally Data Transfer Project Overview and 
Fundamentals, DATA TRANSFER PROJECT (July 20, 2018), https://datatransferproject.dev/dtp-
overview.pdf.
8. Augmenting Compatibility and Competition by Enabling Service Switching Act of 
2019, S. 2658, 116th Cong. (2019).
9. See also Consumer Online Privacy Rights Act, S. 2986, 116th Cong. § 105(a) 
(2019) (providing for a right to data portability stronger than that in the CCPA because it re-
quires data to be made available in a computer-readable format, but weaker than the right pro-
vided in the GDPR because it does not require data controllers to transfer the data to a new 
entity upon request).
10. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100-1799.100; Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the Europe-
an Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with 
Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and Re-
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tor competition. The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA), for exam-
ple, adopts portability to allow consumers to hold platforms accountable for 
how they track and sell personal data.
11
The law offers little utility to new 
market entrants since it does not even require platforms to make their data 
available in a machine-readable format—the CCPA explicitly allows com-
panies to transfer data via a toll-free number.
12
The right to data portability in Europe’s General Data Protection Regu-
lation (GDPR)
13
offers more utility to competitors, but not as much as it 
could, given that its main purpose is to grant consumers greater control over 
their own data.
14
Article 20 requires data controllers to allow consumers to 
export their personal data in a machine-readable format, and where techni-
cally feasible, directly transmit data to the new controller.
15
European legal 
scholars argue that this improves competition by lowering the cost for users 
to change platforms.
16
But in certain circumstances, the aims of data control 
and competition directly conflict.
17
For example, if a data subject tries to 
port data that overlaps with someone else’s, the GDPR states that it is more 
important to respect the privacy and erasure rights of the second data subject 
than portability rights of the first.
18
The Lei Geral de Proteção de Dados (LGPD)—Brazil’s data protection 
law—also gives data subjects the right to port their data from one data con-
troller to another.
19
However, unlike the GDPR, which requires the consid-
pealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), art. 20, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 
[hereinafter GDPR]; Personal Data Protection (Amendment) Act 2020 (Sing.).
11. The CCPA gives consumers rights to access all personal data a platform has col-
lected on them, delete that information, and access certain knowledge about how their person-
al data gets sold, including what data has been sold and what category of business has bought 
it. Users also have the right to prevent buyers from reselling it without permission. CAL. CIV.
CODE §§ 1798.105, .110, .115.
12. See id. § 1798.130. The CCPA also only requires platforms to send twelve months’
worth of user data.
13. GDPR. art. 20.
14. Id. recital 68 (“To further strengthen the control over his or her own data, where the 
processing of personal data is carried out by automated means, the data subject should also be 
allowed to receive personal data concerning him or her which he or she has provided to a con-
troller”).
15. Id. art. 20.
16. See generally Inge Graef, Blurring Boundaries of Consumer Welfare: How to Cre-
ate Synergies Between Competition, Consumer and Data Protection Law in Digital Markets,
in PERSONAL DATA IN COMPETITION, CONSUMER PROTECTION AND INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW (Mor Bakhoum et al., eds. 2018); Damien Geradin & Monika Kuschewsky, 
Competition Law and Personal Data: Preliminary Thoughts on a Complex Issue (Feb. 13, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2216088).
17. See generally Tal Zarsky, The Privacy-Innovation Conundrum, 19 LEWIS & CLARK 
L. REV. 115, 141 (2015).
18. See GDPR, supra note 13, art. 20.
19. Abigayle Erickson, Note, Comparative Analysis of the EU’s GDPR and Brazil’s
LGPD: Enforcement Challenges with the LGPD, 44 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 862, 883 (2019); Lei 
No. 13.709, de 14 de Agosto de 2018, Diário Oficial Da União [D.O.U.] de 15.8.2018 (Braz.), 
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eration of the data subject’s individual rights before the “legitimate inter-
ests” of the data controller, the LGPD allows controllers to weigh the two 
considerations against one another.
20
It is still unclear what this balance 
means for the competitive utility of Brazilian data portability, since the law 
has only recently gone into effect as of this writing.
Only some of these data portability laws attempt to address platform 
barriers to entry, and none attempt to address barriers beyond switching 
costs.
21
These barriers to entry, here meaning the structural economic disad-
vantages faced by some firms but not others,
22
may still preclude new plat-
forms from entering the market. For example, a platform that can overcome 
an incumbent’s switching costs may still fail to overcome its network ef-
fects or economies of scale.
In this Article, I argue that the technical approaches to data portability, 
as encouraged by existing regulation, fail to improve barriers to entry suffi-
ciently to allow new platforms to enter the market. As an alternative to the 
current popular approaches to implementing portability, namely one-off ex-
ports and APIs, I recommend a new approach that I call collective portabil-
ity to better address these barriers. Collective portability allows groups of 
users to coordinate in order to transfer data they share to a new platform. 
This not only helps new market entrants overcome switching costs, but also 
addresses the barriers of unique data access, economies of scale, and net-
work effects.
In making suggestions on how to evaluate and improve data portabil-
ity’s viability as a tool for regulating competition, this Article seeks to con-
tribute to two broader bodies of literature. The first is the literature on data 
as an economic asset. Scholars often discuss the economic advantages and 
normative drawbacks of data-rich technical systems, but rarely discuss the 
contexts in which data-based advantages fail to be realized. To the extent 
this conversation occurs, it is mostly done through analogies, such as de-
translated in BRAZILIAN GENERAL DATA PROTECTION LAW (Ronaldo Lemos et al. trans., 
2019), https://iapp.org/media/pdf/resource_center/Brazilian_General_Data_Protection_
Law.pdf (last visited June 7, 2020) [hereinafter LGPD].
20. See Steven Blickensderfer et al., Brazil’s New Data Protection Law: An Overview 
and Four Key Takeaways for U.S. Companies, NAT’L L. REV. (May 2, 2019), https:/
/www.natlawreview.com/article/brazil-s-new-data-protection-law-overview-and-four-key-
takeaways-us-companies; Richie Koch, What is the LGPD? Brazil’s Version of the GDPR,
https://gdpr.eu/gdpr-vs-lgpd (last visited Dec. 22, 2020).
21. See Peter Swire & Yianni Lagos, Why the Right to Data Portability Likely Reduces 
Consumer Welfare, 72 MD. L. REV. 338, 349 (2013).
22. See, e.g., ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., GLOSSARY OF INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANISATION ECONOMICS AND COMPETITION LAW 13–14 (1990), http://www.oecd.org
/regreform/sectors/2376087.pdf; Yafit Lev-Aretz & Katherine J. Strandburg, Regulation and 
Innovation: Approaching Market Failure from Both Sides 4 (Pub. L. & Legal Theory Rsch. 
Paper Series, Working Paper No. 19-48, 2019), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3462522.
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bates over whether data is the new oil.
23
Through my analysis of data porta-
bility, I show how data is not a fungible asset with value in isolation. Ra-
ther, the value of data depends on its context, and the transferability of that 
value depends on the capacity to maintain that context between services.
Second, this Article seeks to contribute to the larger literature on regu-
lating tech companies. As scholars and policymakers consider how to man-
age platform giants, data portability will be an important tool in the regula-
tory tool belt. But data portability is not a panacea, and what works as a 
matter of policy may fail in technical implementation. This Article exam-
ines various real-world examples of data portability that are well-known in 
Silicon Valley but not often analyzed in legal scholarship. They will hope-
fully serve as a good prism through which to interpret existing scholarship 
and bolster new scholarship.
I build my argument on three types of sources. The first is theoretical 
work done on barriers to entry from the fields of law, economics, and in-
formation systems. Second is anecdotes from real data portability regimes 
and analogous efforts, mostly from real tech companies. Despite the insist-
ence that data portability improves competitiveness in the tech sector, I 
could not find any products built off of data specifically from one-off ex-
ports
24
(despite the fact that Facebook has allowed users to download their 
data since 2010
25
and Google since 2011
26
). Therefore, for this part of the 
analysis, I turn to analogous initiatives in the telecom and banking sectors. 
The third type of evidence is real ported data. I downloaded and analyzed 
my own personal data from seven different platforms—Facebook, Google, 
23. See Lauren Henry Scholz, Big Data Is Not Big Oil: The Role of Analogy in the Law 
of New Technologies, 86 TENN. L. REV. 863 (2020). But see Jonathan Vanian, Why Data Is 
the New Oil, FORTUNE (July 11, 2016), https://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-
tech; Joris Toonders, Data is the New Oil of the Digital Economy, WIRED, http:/
/www.wired.com/2014/07/data-new-oil-digital-economy (last visited Feb. 11, 2021).
24. It is technically possible for a market entrant to build a new product off of a one-off 
export since they are computer readable, but in practice they are difficult if not impossible for 
developers to integrate into new or existing products. Data senders tend to provide little to no 
documentation about the structure of data users get from an export, leaving receivers to re-
verse engineer it themselves. Of the seven data portability exports studied for this Article, six 
had no documentation. The seventh, Twitter, seems to use something similar to its own docu-
mented, external facing API, though this is not confirmed anywhere. Also, the Twitter data set 
was the only one not in a cleanly formatted JSON. None of them had any versioning, which 
meant that these platforms could introduce breaking changes at any time. See GABRIEL 
NICHOLAS & MICHAEL WEINBERG, ENGELBERG CTR. ON INNOVATION L. & POL’Y, DATA 
PORTABILITY AND PLATFORM COMPETITION: IS USER DATA EXPORTED FROM FACEBOOK 
ACTUALLY USEFUL TO COMPETITORS? 21 (Nov. 2019).
25. Alexia Tsotsis, Facebook Now Allows You to “Download Your Information”,
TECHCRUNCH (Oct. 6, 2010, 1:52 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/10/06/facebook-now-
allows-you-to-download-your-information.
26. See GOOGLE, The Data Liberation Front Delivers Google Takeout, DATA 
LIBERATION BLOG (June 28, 2011, 1:51 PM), http://dataliberation.blogspot.com/2011/06
/data-liberation-front-delivers-google.html.
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Apple’s iCloud, Instagram, Snapchat, Spotify, and Twitter to understand 
how platforms can and cannot leverage ported data to compete.
Part I defines “data portability” and delineates between two popular ap-
proaches, one-off exports and APIs. Part II assesses how effectively each of 
these approaches helps competitors overcome four different barriers to entry 
raised by big data: switching costs, network effects, economies of scale, and 
unique data access. Part III highlights additional limitations of API portabil-
ity, based on the market behavior of users and platforms, and opportunities, 
based on its innovative potential. I then propose a new approach in Part 
IV—collective portability. I review it through the lens of Facebook’s Down-
load Your Information (DYI) tool, and then explore questions, hypotheti-
cals, and challenges to the approach. I conclude with recommendations for 
regulators.
I. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DATA PORTABILITY
The International Organization for Standardization defines “data porta-
bility” as the “ability to easily transfer data from one system to another 
without being required to re-enter data”.
27
This definition broadly encom-
passes any means of “easy” transfer
28
for any type of data. But data portabil-
ity laws tend to have a narrower focus when defining data portability. The 
GDPR focuses its definition of data portability on personal data—Article 20 
gives Europeans the rights to obtain “personal data concerning [a data sub-
ject] which he or she has provided.”
29
It does not include information a data 
controller inferred from provided personal data or any non-personal data, 
since that data is not considered “provided” by the data subject.
30
Data portability laws also do not provide a data subject access to some-
one else’s personal data, even if it overlaps with her own. This is particular-
ly relevant in the context of deletion laws, like the GDPR’s “right to be for-
gotten.”
31
If Alice is tagged in a photo that Bob took and uploaded, for 
example, portability regimes under the GDPR may allow Bob to port that 
photo but not Alice, since the photo is Bob’s data and someday he may want 
to delete it, which he could not do if Alice had downloaded it.
32
27. Int’l Standards Org. [ISO], Automation Systems and Integration—Oil and Gas In-
teroperability, at 3.23, ISO Standard No. 18101-1:2019 (2019), https://www.iso.org/obp/ui
/#iso:std:iso:ts:18101:-1:ed-1:v1:en:term:3.23 [hereinafter ISO].
28. Forms of transfer that would not be considered easy include manual data entry, an 
external tool, or having a specialist do it. See infra Section II.A.
29. GDPR, supra note 13, art. 20.
30. This Article will largely focus on personal-information-based products and services 
since these are the ones already subject to regulation.
31. GDPR, supra note 13, recital 65.
32. When exactly the “right to be forgotten” applies to social media data has somewhat 
yet to be determined. Many cases fall between the gaps of the extreme examples given by the 
European Commission. See generally European Data Commission, Do We Always Have to 
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By and large though, platforms can themselves decide which user data 
they make portable. To better conceptualize this, imagine a platform repre-
sented as a circle-and-line graph of entities and connections, or points and 
edges.33 Each point represents a person or any discrete piece of content, like 
a message or a video. Each edge represents a relationship between two 
points, like between two people (e.g., friends on Facebook), a person and 
content (e.g., liking a photo) or two pieces of content (e.g., a comment on a 
photo). A specific data portability regime can be visualized as which edges 
and points an individual user is allowed to transfer, and in what context. A 
software service may not make all points and edges portable, particularly 
when they do not fall clearly under the control of a single user, and data 
may fall through the gaps.
There are two main types of portability, and they differ in how they al-
low data to move. The first is one-off export portability, whereby users can 
download a snapshot of the data they have on one platform in a form that 
can be uploaded to another.
34
One-off exports do not require the platform 
which data is being transferred away from (the data sender) and the plat-
form which data is being transferred into (the data receiver) to have a direct 
connection.
35
Often, the user acts as an intermediary between the two plat-
forms, moving data from one to the other. This gives the user full control 
over which data he sends, and it allows him to delete his data from the send-
ing platform if he so desires. In practice, one-off exports often take a long 
time for data controllers to prepare—minutes to hours on some platforms,
36
Delete Personal Data if a Person Asks?, EUR. COMM’N, https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-
topic/data-protection/reform/rules-business-and-organisations/dealing-citizens/do-we-always-
have-delete-personal-data-if-person-asks_en (last visited Feb. 13, 2021). The European Data 
Protection Board has begun to fill in some of these gaps by differentiating between “delisting”
(from search engines) and “full erasure”. See Guidelines 5/2019 on the Criteria of the Right to 
Be Forgotten in the Search Engines Cases Under the GDPR, EUR. DATA PROTECTION BD.
(Dec. 2, 2019), https://edpb.europa.eu/sites/edpb/files/consultation/edpb_guidelines_
201905_rtbfsearchengines_forpublicconsultation.pdf.
33. See ALAN GIBBONS, ALGORITHMIC GRAPH THEORY 1 (1985).
34. The terminology can be confusing, because some refer to one-off export portability 
as “data portability” and API portability as “interoperability”. See generally Oscar Borgogno 
& Giuseppe Colangelo, Data Sharing and Interoperability: Fostering Innovation and Compe-
tition Through APIs, 35 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 1 (2019); see generally Paul De Hert et al., 
The Right to Data Portability in the GDPR: Towards User-Centric Interoperability of Digital 
Services, 34 COMPUT. L. & SEC. REV. 193 (2018). I use the terms “one-off export portability”
and “API portability” to avoid confusion and remind the reader that both, by the ISO defini-
tion, are forms of data portability.
35. See ERIN EGAN, FACEBOOK, DATA PORTABILITY AND PRIVACY 11 (2019), https:/
/about.fb.com/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/data-portability-privacy-white-paper.pdf [herein-
after FACEBOOK PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER]. Egan refers to this relationship as an “open 
transfer.”
36. E.g., Facebook, Twitter.
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days to weeks on others
37
—because the data sender may have to move a lot 
of data at once that is not stored in an easily accessible format.
38
The second type of data portability is interoperability, whereby users 
allow two or more platforms to exchange information directly with one an-
other. The ongoing connection between systems facilitates the transfer of 
live, up-to-date information, often through defined and documented proto-
cols called application programming interfaces (“APIs”). To avoid confu-
sion with uses of the term “interoperability” in other contexts,
39
I will refer 
to this approach as API portability.40
In contrast with one-off exports, APIs require the data sender and data 
receiver to maintain an ongoing relationship.
41
The receiver requests data 
from the sender, allowing it to obtain data faster and more frequently. It also 
lets the data sender observe and control what, when, and how the receiver 
gets data, usually through rate limiting (which limits how frequently it can 
make API requests) and key registration (which requires the receiver to reg-
ister with the sender to access the API, thus allowing the sender to see how 
it uses the API and cut off access if necessary). There are reasons outside of 
competition for data senders to retain this kind of control, including securi-
ty, preventing spam, and keeping costs down. However, these mechanisms 
have also been used for anti-competitive purposes, as will be discussed lat-
er.
42
To understand the difference between one-off exports and APIs, imag-
ine that Carlo keeps track of his recipes in an app called CookUp but wants 
to move them to a new app called Tazte. If CookUp allows for one-off ex-
port portability, Carlo can download his recipes, upload them to Tazte, and, 
if he wants, delete that data from CookUp. The export is just a snapshot of 
Carlo’s data on CookUp, so if Carlo later adds a recipe to CookUp that 
same recipe would not also appear on Tazte. However, if CookUp gives API 
access to Tazte, perhaps through a “Sign In With CookUp” button, the two 
37. E.g., Spotify, Snapchat.
38. The databases used to store this data are often optimized for some operations over 
others. Since all platforms explored here were originally developed after portability laws ex-
isted, it is unlikely that their databases are optimized for downloading all of a user’s data.
39. “Interoperability” is often seen as synonymous with “compatibility”. In this con-
text, the ISO definition makes the most sense: the “ability of two or more systems or applica-
tions to exchange information and to mutually use the information that has been exchanged.”
Information technology—Cloud computing—Interoperability and portability, No. 19941 Int’l
Standards Org. & Int’l Electrotechnical Comm’n. [ISO/IEC] (2017), https://www.iso.org/obp
/ui/#iso:std:iso-iec:19941:ed-1:v1:en.
40. APIs can be used for more than moving data around. They can also allow applica-
tions to expose features of their system (e.g., database storage, algorithms.) In this Article, I 
only consider the strict portability use case.
41. FACEBOOK PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 35, at 12. Facebook calls this a 
“partnership transfer.”
42. See infra Section III.A.
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systems can directly exchange live data. Thus, if Carlo adds or deletes a rec-
ipe to CookUp, the two lists could potentially sync.
One-off export and API portability are not strictly dichotomous. For ex-
ample, a data sender and data receiver may be in direct communication for a 
brief period of time and then be cut off from one another. Or a data sender 
may only let users transfer their data to a platform if certain conditions are 
met, such as only allowing health data to be sent to another HIPAA-
compliant platform.
43
This will become relevant in Part IV when I propose a 
new approach to portability that mixes elements from both one-off and API 
portability.
II. DATA PORTABILITY AND BARRIERS TO ENTRY
Competition problems in the tech sector differ meaningfully from com-
petition problems in other sectors because technology firms often have 
business models that depend on and leverage the advantages of big data.
44
Scholars argue that disparities in data held by technology firms can create 
barriers to entry that make it difficult for non-dominant platforms to com-
pete.
45
In this section, I review four of these barriers: switching costs, unique 
data access, economies of scale, and network effects. I have ordered them 
based on their ability to be alleviated by current approaches to data portabil-
ity from best to worst. These four barriers will serve as an operational defi-
nition of competition
46
and will be used to evaluate the competitive utility of 
one-off and API portability respectively.
A. Switching Costs
If a user has a lot of her data on one platform, there may be a significant 
cost for her to switch to another platform. For example, if she has rated 
hundreds of books read on Amazon’s Goodreads platform, she may not be 
willing to switch to a new, more preferable platform if it means having to 
43. FACEBOOK PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 35, at 12. Facebook calls this a 
“conditioned transfer.”
44. I define this term with the four Vs of big data: volume, velocity, variety, veracity. 
In other words, “big data” sets are large, frequently updated, gathered from various sources, 
and reasonably accurate.
45. See, e.g., The Four V’s of Big Data, IBM BIG DATA & ANALYTICS HUB (2015), 
www.ibmbigdatahub.com/infographic/four-vs-big-data. Different sources expand or contract 
this mnemonic, ranging between three and six V’s. Matt Griffin et al., A Case Study: Analyz-
ing City Vitality with Four Pillars of Activity—Live, Work, Shop, and Play, 4 BIG DATA 60, 
61 (2016), https://www.liebertpub.com/doi/full/10.1089/big.2015.0043.
46. Competition can be an elusive term so it is easier to evaluate by taking on a non-
comprehensive but also non-recursive operationalization. See generally Paul McNulty, Eco-
nomic Theory and the Meaning of Competition, 82 Q.J. ECON. 639, 639–40 (1968).
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manually re-enter every book she read. Switching costs thereby act as a bar-
rier to entry.
47
One-off data exports are naturally suited to lower switching costs since 
data portability is by definition the “ability to easily transfer data.”
48
A one-
off export lowers switching costs in the Goodreads example because the us-
er values her data (reading history) for its own sake, not just in the context 
of other data on the Goodreads platform that could not be exported (e.g., 
comments from other users). One-off exports work similarly well for other 
types of data that users value for its own sake but are difficult to move, such 
as photos, videos, and blog posts.
49
There is historical precedent for one-off exports
50
successfully improv-
ing competition in the telecom sector. On November 24, 2003, the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) mandated mobile phone number port-
ability, requiring all wireless carriers to allow customers who wished to 
switch to move their phone number to another carrier.
51
Previously, if a cus-
tomer wanted to change carriers, he would also have to abandon his existing 
phone number. By removing this switching cost, the FCC hoped to increase 
competition between carriers.
52
Looking at cost as a proxy for competition, 
mobile number portability was an across the board success. Small, medium, 
and large phone plans all became cheaper, and price dispersion between 
companies offering analogous plans decreased.
53
Well-designed APIs can drive switching costs even lower than one-off 
exports. Streamlined design elements like the “Sign in with Facebook” but-
ton make for a more seamless transfer experience than downloading and up-
loading an export file. APIs also allow users to change services without 
47. Daniel Rubinfeld & Michal Gal, Access Barriers to Big Data, 59 ARIZ. L. REV.
339, 364 (2017).
48. ISO, supra note 27.
49. Facebook has already taken this approach with its port to Google Photos project. 
See Steve Satterfield, Driving Innovation in Data Portability with a New Photo Transfer Tool,
FACEBOOK (Dec. 2, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/12/data-portability-photo-transfer-
tool.
50. See generally Minjung Park, The Economic Impact of Wireless Number Portability,
59 J. INDUS. ECON. 714 (2011). Mobile phone number portability is an example of a one-off 
export, not interoperability. When transferring a number, the sender and receiver do need to 
communicate with one another once the relevant data, originally allocated by the North Amer-
ican Numbering Plan Administrator, is sent. The FCC also mandates this process happens in a 
timely manner, and it usually takes about two hours.
51. See generally Telephone Number Portability/CTIA Petitions for Declaratory Ruling 
on Wireline-Wireless Porting Issues, Memorandum Opinion and Order, FCC 03-284, 18 FCC 
Rcd. 23697 (2003). This was actually only in the top 100 Metropolitan Statistical Areas. It 
only applied to all markets (despite a Petition for Forbearance filed by a number of telecoms) 
starting May 24, 2004.
52. Id. at 4.
53. For example, unlimited anytime minute plans became more similarly priced be-
tween AT&T and Verizon. Park, supra note 50, at 734–36.
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abandoning the original, further reducing both switching costs and the cost 
of returning to the incumbent.
54
However, data portability does not necessarily cause data to flow from 
dominant services to competitors. The phone number portability example 
sidesteps this dynamic because the telecom industry mostly consists of a 
few dominant players. The tech industry, on the other hand, has a few large 
players and many small ones, and improving competition means making it 
easier for the two groups to compete on the same footing. Yet reducing 
switching costs might actually harm smaller competitors by helping incum-
bent platforms with strong network effects pull in users.
This dynamic plays out on customer relationship management platforms 
(CRMs). A small business may opt for a smaller, cheaper CRM, such as 
Pipedrive, that competes with the industry-standard CRM, Salesforce, on 
price.
55
Once the business grows though, they will have more clients who 
use Salesforce and will want to better integrate with their systems. The 
startup is incentivized to switch to the strongly networked Salesforce as 
soon as they are able. Currently, this can take a while because startups need 
to either buy a third-party tool or pay a specialist to switch CRMs.
56
Lower 
switching costs through data portability could cause businesses to switch 
away from small CRMs sooner than they otherwise would, making it even 
more difficult for them to compete with Salesforce’s network effects.
B. Unique Data Access
Critics who argue that big data does not act as a barrier to entry point 
out that data is a non-rivalrous, non-exclusive resource.
57
However, there are 
cases in which a platform can have unique and functionally exclusive access 
to certain data. For example, an IoT thermometer company may have 
unique access to data concerning a patient’s body temperature, or an oil 
company may have unique access to particular geothermal data.
Data portability can somewhat mitigate the advantage of unique data 
access. If an IoT thermometer company makes its data portable, a health 
tracking app can use that data to give its users a better sense of their overall 
health. However, the data sender will likely have more context about how 
the data was collected since it has greater knowledge of its own internal sys-
tems. This translates into knowledge about which data is more trustworthy. 
54. See infra Section III.B.
55. Interview with Berk Birand, CEO, Fero Labs, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 21, 2019); 
D.P. Taylor, Pipedrive vs. Salesforce: A CRM Comparison for 2021, BLUEPRINT (Jan. 6, 
2021), https://www.fool.com/the-blueprint/pipedrive-vs-salesforce.
56. Id.; see generally IMPORT2 WIZARD, https://www.import2.com.
57. See generally Anja Lambrecht & Catherine Tucker, Can Big Data Protect a Firm 
from Competition? (Dec. 18, 2015) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2705530); Darren Tucker & Hill Wellford, Big Mistakes Regarding Big Data,
ANTITRUST SOURCE, A.B.A. (Dec. 1, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2549044.
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Additionally, the data sender may withhold some of the data it collects. It 
may not want to overload the receiver with excessive data, or it may want 
withhold data for its own advantage. The IoT thermometer company may 
choose not to expose its internal diagnostic data because it is unnecessary, 
or because it undermines the confidence of the temperature taken, or be-
cause it undermines user privacy.
The U.K. Department for Business Innovation & Skills is attempting to 
lower the barriers of unique data access in the financial tech sector through 
a portability initiative called Midata. Midata makes it easier for consumers 
to access information about their bank transactions in hopes of allowing 
them to compare the prices of different products using their own data.
58
The 
initiative first focused on the banking industry though there are plans to ex-
tend it to energy and telecoms. Specifically, the government wanted to ena-
ble consumers to download their historical bank transaction data in a stand-
ardized format so they could use price comparison tools to see whether they 
could save by moving to another bank. By opening up this information that 
banks might otherwise have unique access to, the government hoped that 
customers would switch bank accounts more frequently, the way they do 
with credit cards, thus improving competition.
59
The Midata initiative first rolled out in 2014 and became compulsory in 
2015, and so far it seems to be neither a significant success nor failure. The 
only major company that offers the hoped-for price comparison service is 
GoCompare,
60
and their tool is not without criticism.
61
The U.K. Department 
for Business Innovation & Skills has not released data on whether bank ac-
count switching has increased.
However, Midata’s standardization of how banks make transaction data 
available to users may lead to other benefits in the future. Previously, most 
U.K. banks permitted users to download their data in some form or another, 
but many made their data available only in a non-machine readable format, 
like PDF. Banks also varied widely in how far back in the transaction histo-
58. See U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, PERSONAL DATA: REVIEW OF 
THE MIDATA VOLUNTARY PROGRAMME 3 (2014), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk
/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/327845/bis-14-941-review-of-the-
midata-voluntary-programme-revision-1.pdf.
59. See id. at 3–4.
60. Money Comparison, GOCOMPARE, https://www.gocompare.com/money (last visit-
ed Mar. 4, 2021). Numerous business leaders have praised the midata initiative (e.g., Martin
Lewis from MoneySavingExpert, Alistair Crane from Grapple) but have yet to create their
own comparison tools, so far as I can tell. See Press Release, U.K. DEP’T FOR BUS.,
INNOVATION & SKILLS ET AL., Businesses Get Creative with Consumer Data at the ‘Midata’
Innovation Lab Launch (July 10, 2013), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/businesses-
get-creative-with-consumer-data-at-the-midata-innovation-lab-launch.
61. Midata: Which? First Look, WHICH? (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.which.co.uk
/news/2015/03/midata-which-first-look-399235. It also is unclear how much the tool is actual-
ly used, and since its initial release GoCompare has reduced the prominence of the midata tool 
on their website.
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ry users could download data from (sometimes months, sometimes years). 
Midata also allowed the British government to set unified privacy standards 
for exported banking data.
62
Even if the data is underutilized now, standard-
ization allows this data to potentially be used by new products in the future. 
The U.K. briefly ran the Midata Innovation Lab to explore potential uses for 
open data in banking and other industries.
63
Sometimes, platforms can create a barrier to entry by having uniquely 
fast access to data.
64
Stucke and Grunes discuss this in terms of “nowcast-
ing,”
65
the ability for a company to use the velocity of data they receive to 
identify trends before others. For example, Lyft’s dynamic pricing works by 
increasing the price when it notices certain patterns of orders occurring in an 
area (e.g., people trickling out of a concert early before a massive rush).
66
The combination of timely data and broad historical data allows Lyft to 
more quickly and accurately adjust their prices to a customer’s willingness 
to pay than a rival app with fewer users.
67
Twitter may use a similar process 
to identify trending topics faster than other social media sites, thus further 
perpetuating itself as the place to go for the most up-to-date conversation.
68
One-off exports cannot address this kind of speed-based barrier to en-
try, but APIs can. As mentioned before, one-off exports take a long time to 
prepare all of a user’s data, anywhere from minutes to months. APIs allow 
for smaller chunks of information to be accessed more quickly (often in a 
fraction of a second) and more frequently.
C.  Economies of Scale
Economies of scale occur when a firm increases in efficiency as it in-
creases in size. Usually, these gains in purchasing, managerial, and market-
ing power are eventually curbed by diseconomies of scale. Platforms that 
improve and grow from increased data collection, however, experience un-
62. ATM transactions are unredacted, debit card transactions and fees redact card num-
ber data, and other transactions redact all descriptive data. Midata for Personal Current Ac-
counts, MIDATA, http://www.pcamidata.co.uk [https://web.archive.org/web/20190306215048
/http://www.pcamidata.co.uk/].
63. See generally MIDATA INNOVATION LAB, http://www.midatalab.org.uk (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2020).
64. See MAURICE E. STUCKE & ALLEN P. GRUNES, BIG DATA AND COMPETITION 
POLICY 162–86 (2016); Rubinfeld & Gal, supra note 47, at 353.
65. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 64, at 8.
66. See Davide Crapis & Chris Sholley, Dynamic Pricing to Sustain Marketplace Bal-
ance, MEDIUM (Nov. 10, 2020), https://eng.lyft.com/dynamic-pricing-to-sustain-marketplace-
balance-1d23a8d1be90.
67. Id.; see also Dawn Woodward, Matching and Dynamic Pricing in Ride-Hailing 
Platforms, MICROSOFT RSCH. (May 1, 2018), https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research
/video/matching-dynamic-pricing-ride-hailing-platforms.
68. See Shahab Saquib & Rashid Ali, Understanding Dynamics of Trending Topics in 
Twitter, INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON COMPUTING, COMMUNICATION AND 
AUTOMATION, May 5–6, 2017, at 98–103.
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bounded economies of scale.
69
Stucke and Grunes describe how the dynamic 
plays out:
[T]he more people actively or passively contribute data, the more 
the company can improve the quality of its product, the more at-
tractive the product is to other users, the more data the company 
has to further improve its product, which becomes more attractive 
to prospective users.
70
Growth and informational economies of scale are paramount virtues in 
the culture of Silicon Valley.
71
Many platforms only become profitable once 
they reach a certain scale or market share, so they depend on venture capi-
tal, often for years, to offset their high upfront costs.
Many scholars, namely those subscribing to the Chicago School view, 
argue that economies of scale do not themselves constitute barriers to en-
try.
72
Others argue that the drive to reach and maintain economies of scale 
incentivize certain barrier creating behaviors. Khan describes two such be-
haviors in the context of Amazon: predatory pricing and vertical integra-
tion.
73
Firms may even go so far as to take data from other platforms, as 
Google Maps did when it scraped images from Yelp to increase the number 
of photos it had for businesses.
74
Data portability can only help competitors overcome information econ-
omies of scale if it is implemented in a way that can bring a lot of data and
users away from the data sender to the data receiver. There is not much of a 
difference between APIs and one-off exports on this front. Though APIs 
help receivers save on storage costs and provide access to up-to-date, target-
ed information, the relative economies of scale between the receiver and the 
sender may not change as much because the data continues to exist on the 
incumbent platform. Even if users want to move away from the incumbent 
platform, informational economies of scale may mean that competitors’ ser-
vices are vastly inferior to the incumbent’s until those users actually move, 
creating a coordinated action chicken-and-egg problem.
69. See Robert Wilson, Informational Economies of Scale, 6 BELL J. ECON. 184, 184–
95 (1975), https://www.jstor.org/stable/3003221.
70. STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 64, at 170.
71. See generally PETER THIEL & BLAKE MASTERS, ZERO TO ONE: NOTES ON 
STARTUPS, OR HOW TO BUILD THE FUTURE, CROWN BUSINESS (2014); BEN HOROWITZ, THE 
HARD THING ABOUT HARD THINGS: BUILDING A BUSINESS WHEN THERE ARE NO EASY 
ANSWERS, HARPER BUSINESS (2014).
72. MARC A. EISNER, ANTITRUST AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMICS: INSTITUTIONS,
EXPERTISE, AND POLICY CHANGE 105 (1991).
73. Khan, supra note 2, at 722–37. But see Daniel Crane, The Tempting of Antitrust: 
Robert Bork and the Goals of Antitrust Policy, 79 ANTITRUST L.J. 835, 852 (2014).
74. See Natasha Tiku, Yelp Claims Google Broke Promise to Antitrust Regulators,
WIRED (Sept. 12, 2017, 2:01 PM), https://www.wired.com/story/yelp-claims-google-broke-
promise-to-antitrust-regulators.
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Platforms have successfully used data portability to bootstrap their 
growth, but often at the expense of other normative values. LinkedIn adopt-
ed a legally dubious approach to data portability, colloquially known as 
“growth hacking,” shortly after its founding in 2002.
75
Unlike Friendster, an 
open social network and the most popular at the time, LinkedIn was meant 
to connect professionals who knew each other in real life, allowing users to 
better trust recommendations made on the platform. This gated system as-
sured that connections between users were meaningful, but it also meant 
less of them, which translated into a sparser network.
76
LinkedIn’s revenue 
streams (job listings, subscriptions for improved communications, adver-
tisements) all depended on the platform having many users and connections, 
so it needed to find a way to grow.
77
To bootstrap its growth, LinkedIn ported contact lists from email cli-
ents, a novel strategy at the time.
78
It built a plugin for the Microsoft Out-
look email client that mined a user’s contacts and sent out invitations to 
people who had not already signed up for LinkedIn. In 2011, LinkedIn al-
lowed users to upload their email contact lists from other clients with its 
“Add Connections” feature, and soon, up to 7% of users were uploading 
their address books, thus increasing the number of invitations sent to join 
LinkedIn by more than 30%.
79
LinkedIn gained access to even more contact 
information by acquiring Rapportive, another product that vacuumed up da-
ta from email clients.
80
LinkedIn eventually sent out so many invitations that it ran into legal 
trouble. When someone who was invited to LinkedIn through the Add Con-
nections feature did not respond, LinkedIn would follow up two more times, 
without explicit permission from the inviter.
81
If a person who was not a 
member of LinkedIn appeared in multiple uploaded contact lists, that could 
mean a huge volume of email. LinkedIn faced a lawsuit over this activity in 
2015 and paid out $13 million in a settlement.
82
By then though, LinkedIn 
had already leveraged the scale of email to create its own scale. It had 
75. See Morgan Brown, LinkedIn Growth Engine: The Never Ending Viral Loop,
GROWTHHACKERS (2014), https://growthhackers.com/growth-studies/linkedin.
76. See id.
77. See Ellen Lee, LinkedIn’s Startup Story: Connecting the Business World, CNN
MONEY (June 2, 2009, 10:24 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2009/06/02/smallbusiness
/linkedin_startup_story.smb/index.htm [https://web.archive.org/web/20180327012620/https:/
/money.cnn.com/2009/06/02/smallbusiness/linkedin_startup_story.smb/index.htm].
78. Brown, supra note 75.
79. Id.
80. See Anthony Ha, Rapportive Announces Acquisition by LinkedIn, (Basically) Con-
firms $15M Price, TECHCRUNCH (Feb. 22, 2012, 2:04 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2012/02
/22/rapportive-linkedin-acquisition.
81. Jacob Kastreakes, LinkedIn Agrees to Settle Unwanted Email Lawsuit, VERGE (Oct. 
2, 2015, 8:47 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/2/9444067/linkedin-email-lawsuit-
settlement-add-connections.
82. Id.
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grown consistently, from 37 million members in 2009 to over 400 million 
members in 2016 when Microsoft acquired the company for $26.2 billion.
83
The growth story of LinkedIn shows how portability, especially when 
done shrewdly and through backchannels, can improve competition at the 
expense of end users. The “growth hacking” approach raises serious ques-
tions about privacy, security, and spam. A portability regime should allow 
for competition to thrive without impinging the rights and control of users 
over their data.
D. Network Effects
Network effects occur when a product or service increases in value as 
more people use it. If one platform grows far larger than its competitors, 
that means network effects may entrench their advantage, creating a barrier 
to entry for others.
84
There are two types of positive network effects: direct
and indirect.85 Direct network effects occur when economic agents value a 
platform more when similar economic agents use it, like how telephone us-
ers gained value when others had telephones since it meant more people 
they could call. Similarly, Twitter benefits from positive network effects, 
since more active users on Twitter leads to more relevant and timely tweets. 
Indirect positive network effects occur when an economic agent benefits 
from a different kind of agent using the platform. For example, Lyft drivers 
benefit from more riders on the app and vice versa, as drivers can more 
quickly find passengers and passengers have shorter pick up times. A failure 
to capitalize on network effects leads to a platform’s demise—a new rides-
haring app will have a hard time attracting drivers without riders and vice 
versa; a rival to Twitter will have difficulty establishing itself as a dominant 
public forum if no one is there.
Prominent data economist David S. Evans outlines strategies in his 
catalyst framework for new platforms entering the market to build up their 
own network effects.
86
The value of multisided platforms, he argues, is that 
they bring together distinct economic agents, reducing transaction costs for 
them to find one another. The difficult part for platforms is finding the ini-
tial catalyst to get those economic agents onto the platform in the first place.
This challenge takes many forms. Sometimes, a platform needs to at-
tract economic agents to one side of the market first. For example, many so-
cial media platforms match users with advertisers but only need users to ini-
83. Numbers of LinkedIn Members From 1st Quarter 2009 to 3rd Quarter 2016,
STATISTA (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.statista.com/statistics/274050/quarterly-numbers-of-
linkedin-members.
84. See STUCKE & GRUNES, supra note 64, at 162.
85. Michael Katz & Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J.
ECON. PERSPS. 93, 95–96 (1994).
86. DAVID EVANS, PLATFORM ECONOMICS: ESSAYS ON MULTI-SIDED BUSINESSES
58–62 (2011).
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tially get their business off the ground (so long as they have funding to run 
their service). In other cases, both sides of the market need to be catalyzed 
at once. A dating app that targets heterosexual individuals, for example, 
would need to have both straight men and straight women on the app to en-
courage the other to join. And some platforms need agents on one side to 
make a large, disproportionately risky initial investment. Video game sys-
tems, for example, must convince developers to make a large investment in 
their system by building games for it, often even before the system has 
reached the market and has any users.
Evans offers numerous proposals for addressing catalytic problems, and 
they all involve coordinating groups of economic agents to move onto the 
platform together.
87
One strategy he suggests is contingent contracts, which 
encourages one side to join after certain conditions have been met. Another 
approach is the “zig-zag strategy”, in which the platform alternates onboard-
ing chunks of users onto each side. A third Evans approach is the marquee 
strategy, in which the platform tries to attract a prestige user who will bring 
a following with them.
88
Competitors could potentially use data portability as a part of any of 
these strategies. However, if individuals are only able to export their data 
one user at a time, it may be too difficult to organize enough users for the 
platform to reach catalyzation. Rather, groups of users would need to be 
able to move their data together in coordinated movements. As of today, no 
major platform offers a data portability tool that allows groups of users to 
migrate en masse to a new platform.
89
One might argue that platforms could use one-off exports to address 
catalytic problems and network effects by allowing users to download their 
social graphs.
90
Facebook allows something similar in its one-off export tool 
Download Your Information—users can download a list of their friends 
which allows them to match with any friend who uploads their own list.
91
87. Id.
88. Microsoft employed this strategy with their game streaming when they paid Ninja, 
a popular streamer of the most streamed game Fortnite, to move exclusively to their platform 
from Amazon’s platform, Twitch. See Tramel Raggs, Fortnite Star Ninja Leaves Twitch, to 
Stream on Microsoft’s Mixer, WASH. POST (Aug. 1, 2019, 6:18 PM), https:/
/www.washingtonpost.com/sports/2019/08/01/fortnite-star-ninja-leaves-twitch-stream-
microsofts-mixer.
89. See infra Part IV.
90. See Josh Constine, Facebook Shouldn’t Block You from Finding Friends on Com-
petitors, TECHCRUNCH (Apr. 13, 2018, 1:58 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/04/13/free-
the-social-graph; see generally FACEBOOK PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 35.
91. A brief technical note: when users download a list of their friends, in a file called 
friends.json, they get their name and the timestamp of their friendship. This combined with 
the name of the user who has uploaded their friends list could more or less work to connect 
two users if they both uploaded their friends list, without giving any information about mutual 
friends who did not consent. This is called an edge export. See generally FACEBOOK 
PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 35. However, the identifier is not strictly unique—if 
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Without access to external contact information though,
92
the exported social 
graph cannot fuel growth. It only becomes useful once a platform has a 
large number of users, at which point it will benefit from its own network 
effects anyways.
APIs address network effects better than one-off exports only to the ex-
tent that data senders are comfortable sending more data knowing that they 
can cut off access.
93
This data is limited in usefulness unless it also includes 
external contact data, which in the wake of Cambridge Analytica
94
and other 
privacy scandals happens less often. In general, though, APIs do not inher-
ently make it easier for users to coordinate their movements or for platforms 
to overcome network effects.
III. ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS FOR API PORTABILITY
The previous section mentioned multiple advantages that APIs have 
over one-off exports in helping new software services overcome barriers to 
competition. However, APIs come with additional factors regulators should 
consider when creating laws or guidelines around data portability. The main 
difference between one-off exports and APIs is the ongoing relationship be-
tween the data sender and receiver. One-off export regimes do not need to 
consider this relationship since the user acts as an intermediary between the 
two. But API regimes must consider this relationship carefully (especially 
because new products may come to depend on them) and regulators may 
have to step in to balance the power dynamics between them.
This section describes three additional factors specific to APIs and 
competition that regulators should consider. First, competitors may be hesi-
tant to build a product that depends on incumbent APIs out of fear that the 
two John Mills each became friends with two Li Weis at the exact same second, the identifier 
would not be unique. See NICHOLAS & WEINBERG, supra note 24.
92. I looked at my own friends.json file and found that it listed an email address or 
phone number for 1.5% of friends in that list. Facebook does not document what data a user 
should expect to see in their DYI export, so I do not know why the contact information is 
listed for some friends but not others, but it may have to do with their privacy settings. See
NICHOLAS & WEINBERG, supra note 24.
93. E.g., Facebook exhibits this behavior with data they share about a user’s friends. In 
their one-off export tool (Download Your Information), users can only download information 
that includes each of their friends’ names and the time they became friends. Their API (the 
Graph API) also gives a unique ID, but limits the data to friends who have also installed the 
application. See Graph API Reference, FACEBOOK FOR DEVS., https://developers.
facebook.com/docs/graph-api/reference/v7.0/user/friends (last visited Feb. 16, 2021).
94. See Matthew Rosenberg, Nicholas Confessore & Carole Cadwalladr, How Trump 
Consultants Exploited the Facebook Data of Millions, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 17, 2018), https:/
/www.nytimes.com/2018/03/17/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-trump-campaign.html; Ime 
Archibong, New Facebook Platform Product Changes and Policy Updates, FACEBOOK FOR 
DEVS. (Apr. 24, 2018), https://developers.facebook.com/blog/post/2018/04/24/new-facebook-
platform-product-changes-policy-updates.
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incumbent will change them or cut off access. Second, APIs may not lead to 
products that are sufficiently differentiated from the incumbent, and users 
either may not switch to competitors in the first place or may backslide to 
the incumbent. Third, APIs may better serve complementary platforms ra-
ther than analogous direct competitors.
A. Hesitance to Depend on Incumbent APIs
API portability potentially allows competitors to receive more frequent, 
up-to-date data from incumbents, but it also creates a complicated power 
dynamic between data senders and receivers for regulators to manage. From 
a technical standpoint, data senders have complete control over who can re-
ceive data and what data they can receive, and historically platforms have 
used this power to withhold data from threatening competitors. Until recent-
ly, Facebook explicitly disallowed applications that “replicate core func-
tionality that Facebook already provides” in the platform policy for its so-
cial Graph API.
95
It used this justification to cut off access to multiple social 







book did something similar to Prisma, a popular image filter app from 2016 
that used a machine learning technique called “style transfer.”
99
In Novem-
ber 2016, Prisma allowed users to add its filters on Facebook Live streams. 
Within the same month, Facebook revoked Prisma’s ability to use the Face-
book Live API and released its own style transfer feature.
100
Other cases of Facebook restricting API access fall in the gray space be-
tween user protection and anti-competitiveness. Zynga used multiple Face-
book APIs to grow a massive gaming platform on top of Facebook itself. 
95. Josh Constine, Facebook Ends Platform Policy Banning Apps That Copy Its Fea-
tures, TECHCRUNCH (Dec. 4, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2018/12/04/facebook-
allows-competitors.
96. According to emails released by the UK Parliament as part of the Six4Three case, 
this was personally approved by Mark Zuckerberg the day Vine launched. DIGITAL,
CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT COMMITTEE, NOTE BY DAMIAN COLLINS MP, CHAIR OF THE 
DCMS COMMITTEE: SUMMARY OF KEY ISSUES FROM THE SIX4THREE FILES (UK),
https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/culture-media-and-sport/Note-
by-Chair-and-selected-documents-ordered-from-Six4Three.pdf.
97. See Josh Constine, Facebook Blocks Yandex’s New Social Search App from Access-
ing Its Data Just Three Hours After Launch, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 24, 2013, 4:49 PM), https:/
/techcrunch.com/2013/01/24/facebook-blocks-yandex-wonder.
98. See Josh Constine, Facebook Is Cutting off Find Friends Data to “Competing”
Apps That Don’t Share Much Back, Starting with Voxer, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 18, 2013, 3:40 
PM), https://techcrunch.com/2013/01/18/facebook-data-voxer.
99. See generally Vlad Savov, Prisma Will Make You Fall in Love with Photo Filters 
All over Again, VERGE (July 19, 2016, 9:09 AM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/7/19
/12222112/prisma-art-photo-app; Natasha Lomas, Facebook Has Cut off Prisma’s Live Video 
Access, TECHCRUNCH (Nov. 30, 2016, 6:12 AM), https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/30
/facebook-has-cut-off-prismas-live-video-access.
100. Lomas, supra note 99.
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The two companies had a symbiotic relationship, with Zynga accounting for 
19 percent of Facebook’s revenue
101
and Facebook accounting for 93 per-
cent of Zynga’s in 2011.
102
However, their relationship soured: Zynga was 
upset when Facebook started to take 30 percent of its revenue through its 
“Facebook Credits” system,
103
and Facebook was upset with Zynga for 
spamming its users with game invites. As Zuckerberg said in an interview:
A lot of users like playing games, but a lot of users just hate games, 
and that made it a big challenge, because people who like playing 
games wanted to post updates about their farm or frontier or what-
ever to their stream. But people who don’t care about games want 
no updates. So we did some rebalancing so that if you aren’t a 
game player you’re getting less updates.
104
In 2012, Facebook ended its special relationship with Zynga and intro-
duced API changes that hampered Zynga’s business model.
105
Zynga was no 
longer able to have users send out mass game invites to their friends, and 
shortly thereafter users could not invite friends altogether. Around this time, 
Zynga’s valuation dropped from $15 billion to $3 billion in six months.
The stories of Zynga and other competitors cut off from the Facebook 
API serve as a warning to startups and the venture capitalists who fund 
them—a platform that depends on a third-party API for growth may fail if 
the API changes. If regulators try to improve competition by enforcing API 
portability, they would have to figure out how to strike a balance between 
preventing incumbents from breaking competing platforms that depend on 
their APIs and letting those incumbents innovate and update their services. 
The ideal balance may change dramatically between different types of prod-
ucts, making scalable policy difficult.
101. Tomio Geron, Facebook’s Dependence on Zynga Drops, Zynga’s Revenue to Fa-
cebook Flat, FORBES (July 31, 2012, 8:10 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron
/2012/07/31/facebooks-dependence-on-zynga-drops-zyngas-revenue-to-facebook-flat.
102. Zynga Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q) (Oct. 26, 2012).
103. Zynga also threatened to create their own platform. Michael Arrington, Zynga 
Gunning up (and Lawyering up) for War Against Facebook with Zynga Live, TECHCRUNCH
(May 7, 2010, 2:59 PM), https://techcrunch.com/2010/05/07/zynga-gunning-up-and-
lawyering-up-for-war-against-facebook-with-zynga-live.
104. Exclusive: Discussing the Future of Facebook and the Facebook Ecosystem with 
CEO Mark Zuckerberg, ADWEEK (June 22, 2010), https://www.adweek.com/performance-
marketing/exclusive-discussing-the-future-of-facebook-and-the-facebook-ecosystem-with-
ceo-mark-zuckerberg.
105. Tomio Geron, Zynga and Facebook Revamp Deal, Zynga Shares Drop, FORBES
(Nov. 29, 2012, 7:25 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2012/11/29/zynga-and-
facebook-revamp-deal-zynga-shares-drop.
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B. Backslide and Undifferentiated Products
If an incumbent offers an API or other means of interoperability, com-
petitors that hope to build a similar product or service to that incumbent 
may have difficulty differentiating their offering, especially once price has 
reached an equilibrium.
106
If an incumbent and a competitor have nearly 
identical products, even low switching costs will not encourage users to 
change to the competitor. This occurred when the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) opened up competition between local exchange carriers 
(LECs, predominantly the seven Regional Bell Operating Companies, or 
“Baby Bells”) and long-distance companies (e.g., AT&T, MCI, Sprint) in 
the Telecommunications Act of 1996.
107
After the divestiture from AT&T in 1984, LECs were regulated as natu-
ral monopolies and long-distance companies were left to openly compete in 
other areas of telecommunications. When the FCC passed the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996, it wanted LECs and long-distance companies to 
compete in each other’s markets. In order to give the long-distance compa-
nies a fighting chance against the LECs, the Act required LECs to provide 
them with “nondiscriminatory access to network elements on an unbundled 
basis”
108
(a data sharing access scheme similar to an open API) at wholesale 
price. Only once state authorities, the FCC, and the Justice Department all 
agreed that the LECs had adequately given access to their systems
109
would 
the LECs in turn be allowed to go into the long-distance market. This gave 
the long-distance companies a four-year head start to selling packages that 
bundled local and long-distance service.
Despite allowing for competition on more even footing, the 1996 Act 
did not create long term sustainable competition in telecommunications. 
LECs and long-distance companies offered essentially the same product, 
with similar costs and revenue, only adding the minor convenience of giving 
customers one bill instead of two. Very few customers actually switched 
their providers, and those who switched when telecoms started paying cus-
tomers to do so, often switched back when other telecoms made the same 
offer.
110
Wireless eventually destroyed the profits of the long-distance indus-
106. See, e.g., Luuk de Klein & Lisha Zhou, French, Australian Agency Chiefs Share 
Ideas on Privacy, Competition Interplay, in ABA’S 67TH ANTITRUST LAW SPRING MEETING 
CONFERENCE COVERAGE 18, 18 (PaRR ed., 2019), https://www.acuris.com/assets
/PaRRABAreport2019_1.pdf.
107. See PETER W. HUBER, MICHAEL K. KELLOGG & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 5.11.2.2 (2d ed. 2011).
108. 47 U.S.C.S. § 251(c)(3) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116–182).
109. See generally 47 U.S.C.S. § 251 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116–182).
110. Interview with Randy Milch, former General Counsel and Head of Public Policy, 
Verizon Commc’ns, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Nov. 15, 2019); see generally Jerry A. Hausman & 
Gregory J. Sikand, Did Mandatory Unbundling Achieve Its Purpose? Empirical Evidence 
from Five Countries, 1 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 173 (2005).
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try, and the long-distance companies failed to diversify enough to save their 
business model. Most of them were cheaply acquired by LECs, further con-
centrating the telecommunications industry.
111
The 1996 Act was a success in many ways, but the data portability as-
pect of it failed because customers were not willing to bear even a low 
switching cost between offerings that were so similar. Customers that were 
willing to switch—for example, because a competitor offered sign up bo-
nus—could be induced to switch back if the incumbent offered the same 
bonus. The competitors, here the long-distance companies, were limited in 
how much they could differentiate their products so much because they 
were all built on top of the same local exchange connections. Competitors 
that tie their products too closely to incumbent APIs may face a similar is-
sue.
C. Opportunities for Creative Destruction
Despite its issues, API portability still has the potential to improve the 
competitive landscape of the tech sector. To better understand how, it is use-
ful to look at two different notions of competition: neoclassical and Schum-
peterian. Neoclassical economics defines competition in terms of the de-
sired outcomes of improved product and lower price.
112
This approach to 
competition is easy to model and promotes creating directly competing 
products over wholesale innovation. Early 20
th
century economist Joseph 
Schumpeter on the other hand saw competition as a process of “creative de-
struction,” whereby innovative newcomers disrupt and dislodge incum-
bents.
113
It is a process of explosive, unpredictable change that leads to a 
larger paradigm shift towards complementary products rather than directly 
competing ones.
API portability may not work well for encouraging neoclassical compe-
tition, as shown by the example of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, but 
it can encourage Schumpeterian competition. Innovative, complementary 
products are not as easily harmed by backslide and switching costs. And 
even if data senders eventually copy the product themselves, data receivers 
retain a first-mover advantage. This dynamic played out in dating apps—
Tinder used the Facebook API to make it easier for users to build their pro-
files with ported Facebook data. When Facebook released its own dating 
feature later on (again, it took longer to build a complementary product), 
111. See generally Hausman & Sikand, supra note 110.
112. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, United States Competition Policy in Crisis: 
1890-1955, 94 MINN. L. REV. 311 (2009).
113. Joseph A. Schumpeter, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 81–86 (Taylor 
& Francis ed., 2003) (1942).
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Tinder built up enough of a brand name and network effect that it wasn’t a 
threat.
114
The potential for Schumpeterian style competition through APIs can be 
seen with ported banking data in the financial tech sector.
115
Companies like 
Mint, Yodlee, and Quicken leverage banking data, often from multiple 
sources, to give users a comprehensive picture of their finances. Another 
fintech company, Cushion, reads a user’s bank transaction history and nego-
tiates lower fees on her behalf. Plaid, acquired by Visa in 2020 for $5.3 bil-
lion, created APIs that allow third party developers to interface with banks 
to further allow this industry to grow.
116
All of this growth occurred without banks and tech companies cooperat-
ing. Open banking is an example of interoperability without explicitly per-
mitted APIs—fintech companies often use unsanctioned logins and screen 
scraping to collect financial data
117
while banks in turn improve their anti-
scraping technology.
118
At the same time, banks sue tech companies over 
“exceeding authorized access” under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
119
and protection of “nonpublic personal information” under the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act.
120
Tech companies meanwhile insist that the Dodd-Frank 
Act protects their use of consumer data.
121
Given the large technical and fi-
nancial burden of Mint and Plaid-style jerry-rigged interoperability, only a 
fraction of the innovation that would be possible with officially sanctioned 
APIs is represented.
Galvanizing Schumpeterian and neoclassical competition each require 
different approaches,
122
and both have their positives and negatives. Neo-
classical competition is easier to regulate but is unlikely to bring about 
114. Kurt Wagner, Match Group Says Facebook’s New Dating Feature Will Have ‘No 
Negative Impact on Tinder’, RECODE (May 8, 2018, 4:55 PM), https://www.vox.com/2018/5
/8/17332644/match-group-facebook-earnings-tinder-dating-competition. CEO of IAC Joey 
Levin said in response to the release of Facebook Dating, “Come on in. The water’s warm. 
Their product could be great for US/Russia relationships.”
115. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin, Show Me the (Data About the) Money!, 5 
UTAH L. REV. 1277 (2020).
116. See id. at 1287; Visa to Acquire Plaid, VISA (Jan. 13, 2020), https://usa.visa.com
/about-visa/newsroom/press-releases.releaseId.16856.html.
117. For example, Plaid using link injections to get bank credentials. See Ben Ellis 
(benissimo), Privacy/Security Concerns #68, GITHUB (Feb. 11, 2016), https://web.archive.org
/web/20190415103059/https://github.com/plaid/link/issues/68; Whockey, Comment to Plaid 
Deletes GitHub Issue Exposing Imitation of Bank Login UIs, HACKER NEWS (June 8, 2019), 
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=20133806.
118. See Nathan DiCamillo, In Data Dispute with Capital One, Plaid Stands Alone, AM.
BANKER (July 17, 2018, 3:52 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/in-data-dispute-
with-capital-one-plaid-stands-alone.
119. 18 U.S.C.S. § 1030(a)(1) (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116–182).
120. 15 U.S.C.S. §§ 6801–6809 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116–182).
121. See generally 12 U.S.C.S § 5481 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116–182).
122. See generally Tim Wu, Taking Innovation Seriously: Antitrust Enforcement if Inno-
vation Mattered Most, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 313 (2012).
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widescale innovation. Schumpeterian competition creates significant inno-
vative value for firms and consumers when it is successful, but it is difficult 
to predict. In terms of portability, it is hard for policymakers to know 
whether or not certain datasets have innovative potential and should there-
fore be made portable. Schumpeterian competition through API portability 
therefore must be designed on an industry by industry basis. I will set aside 
further interrogation of this problem for a future paper. For now, I will turn 
to a new, more scalable approach to data portability that is designed to max-
imally encourage neoclassical competition.
IV. COLLECTIVE PORTABILITY—A NEW APPROACH
The previous two sections reviewed approaches to data portability that 
focus on providing individual users access to their data. This reflects the 
ways current laws regulate portability and platforms implement portability. 
The individual approach works to alleviate switching costs and some unique 
data access barriers but fails to address network effects and informational 
economies of scale. Previous analysis of existing theories and examples of 
portability suggests these barriers can be better addressed by groups coordi-
nating to move their data all at once.
To this end, I propose a new approach to portability called collective 
portability: the ability for users to easily transfer their data to another plat-
form in its original unit and alongside other users they used it with. More 
specifically, if a group of users shares access to co-created data on a specific 
platform and they want to move that data to a new platform, the original 
platform should facilitate the group in coordinating the transfer (and poten-
tial deletion) of all their data at once. Like API portability, collective porta-
bility requires the data sender and receiver to be in direct communication 
with one another. However, since the relationship does not continue after 
the transfer is complete, a power imbalance between senders and receivers 
is not a concern.
Collective portability works better than one-off exports at lowering 
competitive barriers to entry. Not only does it better address network effects 
and informational economies of scale, but it also facilitates data transfer that 
otherwise could not occur without raising privacy concerns. One-off exports 
only allow users to transfer data that is clearly their own. If data is shared by 
multiple people, it may not end up in any of their exports. Collective porta-
bility includes this data in the transfer, making it more than the sum of every 
individual user’s exports without infringing upon user privacy.
The shortcomings that collective portability addresses can be seen writ 
large in the data Facebook makes available in its Download Your Infor-
mation tool. DYI allows users to download a computer-readable archive of 
all information they have ever entered into Facebook that it still has stored. 
The information includes posts, events attended, comments, advertisements 
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clicked on, and photos uploaded. It does not include data provided by other 
users, like tagged photos or likes from friends.
123
I downloaded my personal DYI archive and below is an anonymized 
example of the data representing my comment on a photo that my friend 




The data I received consists of the text of the comment, the time I post-
ed it,
125
the type of item I commented on (a photo), the name of the group I 
posted to (Little Wanderers), and the name of the person who owns it (Fan-
nee Doolee). I do not have access to the photo itself, or any unique identifi-
123. The information also does not include any inferences Facebook may have made 
about a user. For example, if Facebook has determined that a user supports gun owner rights 
and uses that information to show ads for guns, DYI does not give a user who downloads their 
information access to that insight. See FACEBOOK PORTABILITY WHITE PAPER, supra note 35, 
at 13–16.
124. For this analysis, I downloaded my own Facebook information, which goes from 
2006 to 2019. I downloaded my data in the machine-readable JSON format as opposed to the 
more human-readable HTML format, since this is likely what actual competitors would use to 
integrate the data. My data does not represent the entire range of possible data to download 
because I have not used every feature on Facebook. For example, I have never used Face-
book’s “check in” feature, so my data download has an empty folder where that data would 
be. I also may have had certain privacy settings enabled that prevented certain types of infor-
mation from being downloaded. People who I have interacted with on Facebook may also 
have these settings. All of this is speculative because Facebook provides no documentation 
about what data structures a user should expect from their DYI export. I reached out to Face-
book to get basic information on the rules underlying DYI or even the basic structure of data I 
could expect, but after six months of back and forth, they did not provide any, nor did they 
give any information on how different privacy settings might affect the export. I therefore had 
to write a script to reverse engineer the structure myself. Any data snippets here are anony-
mized versions of those results, though I have kept my own name for the sake of clarity. See
generally Gabriel Nicholas (gajeam), Portability-Project, GITHUB (Sept. 13, 2019), https:/
/github.com/gajeam/Portability-Project [hereinafter Portability Project GitHub].
125. Note that though there are two timestamps, they are identical. See generally id.
" timestamp ": 1597855333 , 
" data ": [ { 
"comment " : 
" timestamp": 1597855333 , 
" comment ": " Wow this vacation looks awesome !", 
" author ": " Gabriel Nicholas ", 
"group " : " Little Wanderers : Traveling with Kids " 
} 
} ], 
" title " : " Gabriel Nicholas commented on Fannee Doolee ' s photo ." 
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ers for the group, person, or photo.
126
If Fannee Doolee downloaded all of 
her photos, she would similarly not have access to my comment. Therefore, 
even if Fannee Doolee and I both uploaded our data to the same competing 
photo-posting-and-commenting platform, it would not have a way to con-
nect my comment to her photo.
Facebook may not have made this system design choice solely to be an-
ti-competitive—it also addresses legitimate privacy concerns. If Fannee 
Doolee does not want to upload her photo to the platform that I upload my 
data to, she would not expect me to be able to bring it there without her 
permission.
127
And if a number of people who commented on that photo 
move to the new platform, she may not want the conversation around her 
photo moved somewhere without her permission. However, these privacy 
protections directly reduce the ability of competitors to recreate features of 
Facebook. DYI makes similar tradeoffs with other types of data, such as 
events, statuses, and likes.
128
Collective portability would avoid this tradeoff between privacy and 
competitive utility, at least as it pertains to Facebook groups. If Little Wan-
derers chose to move to another platform and Fannee Doolee and I both 
consented, under collective portability the new platform would be able to 
show the relationship between her photo and my comment, reducing switch-
ing costs for us and increasing network effects for the new platform.
129
Designing a regime for collective portability is not as straightforward as 
it is for one-off exports, even in this relatively simple Facebook example. 
Below, I outline five questions that platforms and policymakers would have 
to consider in order to implement and regulate collective portability, and I 
apply them to different hypothetical applications. I then look at the ways in 
which collective portability addresses the barriers to entry discussed in Part 
II. Finally, I point out new challenges collective portability raises.
A. Five Questions for a Collective Data Portability Regime
With any portability regime, platforms must make design decisions 
about which data they make available to users and how they make it availa-
126. If I were friends with multiple people named “Fannee Doolee” or in multiple 
groups called “Little Wanderers”, this would be a problem. See generally id.
127. This could be considered an “inappropriate information flow”. See generally
HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF 
SOCIAL LIFE (2009).
128. Notably, it does not occur in data about private messages—users get both sides of 
the conversation and all reactions to messages, meaning that a competitor could in theory use 
this information to build a new messaging platform. See generally Portability Project GitHub,
supra note 124.
129. The profile_information.json file included among other things, my birthday, email 
address, current city, hometown, family members, education and work experiences, and pages 
I had liked ten years ago. See generally id.
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ble. Collective portability raises additional design questions for a platform 
because it involves multiple users, with many potential relationships be-
tween each other and their data. Five such questions are discussed below:
1. Who is in in the collective? For many platforms, groups will 
have clear boundaries—it usually is clear who is and is not on a 
group messaging thread, for example. Some platforms may 
have more informal boundaries around their groups and com-
munities, or no boundaries at all. For example, nothing strictly 
delineates which users are and are not part of “legal Twitter.”
130
Twitter, therefore, may not be well-suited for collective porta-
bility.
2. Which data is part of the collective? Again, this is an easy 
question for smaller, simpler groups like message threads, but 
more difficult for larger, more fluid groups. For example, a 
community platform like Reddit would have to decide whether 
or not it allowed groups to port data cross-posted from another 
community.
131
3. How does the collective come to a decision to port their data?
Collective portability requires the data sender to implement a 
governance mechanism to allow users in the group to decide to 
move to another platform. There is no one-size-fits-all design 
for this mechanism, especially for larger groups. If the data 
sender allows a group to vote on porting their data elsewhere, 
how many users have to vote for the transfer to occur? How are 
inactive group members handled? What happens to data from 
users who voted against the move?
4. How do special user roles affect the transfer decision process?
Some platforms provide certain users in a group more privileg-
es than others. This makes some portability decisions trivial—
if an employer wants to switch their team communication tool, 
she can make a unilateral decision to transfer group data. But 
complications may arise in non-professional communities, 
where administrators and moderators have less unilateral pow-
er.
130. But see Sarah Mui, Best Legal Twitter Accounts of 2018, A.B.A. J. (Dec. 1, 2018, 
12:15 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/best_law_twitter_2018.
131. u/EuroGeologist, How to Crosspost on Reddit in 2018?, REDDIT (May 18, 2018, 
4:54 AM), https://www.reddit.com/r/help/comments/8kbptp/how_to_crosspost_on_
reddit_in_2018.
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5. How does the migration work? Once decisions have been 
reached about which users and which data ought to be trans-
ferred, it is up to the data sender to pass the data along to the 
receiver. Data receivers may have to make tough technical and 
interface designs to handle groups with missing or incomplete 
data due to some users opting out of the migration. Similarly, 
the data receiver’s schema for representing data may not map 
perfectly onto the sender’s, especially if the platforms do not 
share all the same features. Receivers need to decide whether to 
discard this data or handle it another way.
B. Hypothetical Collective Portability Regimes
In this section, I apply the five questions outlined above to hypothetical 
collective portability regimes for Spotify, iMessage, and Facebook. These 
hypotheticals increase in complexity and are meant to highlight the competi-
tive advantages and the difficult-but-manageable challenges of implement-
ing collective portability.
1. Spotify
Imagine I use Spotify to stream music but I want to switch to YouTube 
Music because they offer a similar product at a lower cost. Spotify has 
years’ worth of data on my playlists and albums saved to my library. They 
also have my listening history, which means they can give me high quality 
recommendations for songs I might like.
I am the only user in this collective, since I largely interact with the 
Spotify by myself, and therefore I can make unilateral decisions about my 
data. The data in this collective includes my playlists, music library, and lis-
tening history. Even if friends follow some of my playlists, the boundaries 
between my data and theirs are clear. Network effects, at least in terms of 
interacting within small groups, are less of a concern because the primary 
value of Spotify comes not from the network of other users but interaction 
with the data itself (i.e. listening to music as opposed to interacting with 
friends).
If Spotify were to adopt a collective portability regime, it would facili-
tate me sending all three of these data sources to a competitor, like YouTube 
Music, and in turn, allow me to cancel, pause, or delete my Spotify account. 
On the data receiver’s end, YouTube Music would have to map Spotify’s
representation of songs onto its own, something it would only implement if 
it believed the effort would actually grow its user base.
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2. iMessage
Imagine I am in an iMessage texting thread with four close friends. We 
all agree that we want to move our thread to WhatsApp because I am about 
to switch from an iPhone to an Android and WhatsApp offers better inter-
operating system messaging.
The people in this collective are me and my four friends, and the data is 
our thread, with every message, image, and reaction sent. With so few peo-
ple in the thread, iMessage may require us to unanimously consent to trans-
fer our data. The voting mechanism could be built into iMessage itself and 
users would be able to pass along their WhatsApp credentials to iMessage to 
allow it to make the transfer. Some information that does not translate be-
tween the two systems, such as message reactions (iMessage has them, 
WhatsApp does not) gets lost.
3. Meme Groups
Imagine I am in a ten-thousand person Facebook group called “Anti-
trust Memes for Neo-Brandeisian Teens” where users post dozens of irrev-
erent image macros about competition in the tech sector every day. The ad-
mins of the group fear that Facebook is preventing their content from 
showing up on people’s newsfeeds, and suspiciously, new users seem una-
ble to join. They want to move the group to a new platform MemeOn!, built 
specifically for anti-authoritarian meme groups.
The people in this collective are the group members, and the data is the 
posts in the group, including images and comments. The governance mech-
anism to collectively port this data may be a direct or liquid democracy.
132
Facebook would have to decide how to handle data from users who did not 
vote or voted against the move, though this issue would be easier for groups 
started after Facebook begins collective portability since they could set 
portability options from the beginning. Administrators may have a special 
status, potentially deciding when to call a vote or choosing how many peo-
ple would need to approve the vote for the group to move. Migration would 
raise a number of technical and user interface design questions, though like-
ly every migrating user would need to connect to their MemeOn! account 
(this could be tied in with voting). Old data could be held on Facebook for 
archival purposes or the group could split, with some staying on Facebook 
and others going to MemeOn!.
132. See generally Steve Hardt & Lia C. R. Lopes, Google Votes: A Liquid Democracy 
Experiment on a Corporate Social Network, TECH. DISCLOSURE COMMONS (June 5, 2015), 
https://www.tdcommons.org/dpubs_series/79.
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C. Collective Portability and Barriers to Entry
In this section, I compare how well collective portability alleviates each 
of the previously established four barriers to entry compared to the current 
approaches to portability, one-off exports and APIs.
1. Switching Costs
Collective portability reduces switching costs by making it so that users 
do not have to leave people they know from the old platform behind when 
they switch to a new one. This would be particularly helpful for nascent so-
cial networks, where pioneering users often abandon platforms, even ones 
experiencing viral growth, because they are essentially alone.
133
Collective 
portability also lowers switching costs for groups of users with shared data 
who under other portability regimes would have to leave shared data behind. 
However, if the governance or transfer mechanisms are poorly designed, us-
ers may not take advantage of collective portability and the benefits may not 
be realized.
2. Unique Data Access
Collective portability opens up unique data sources that competitors can 
use as the foundation for building new platforms. By moving users en masse 
and allowing them to bring their data, a new entrant can target a specific 
large group and create a product directly aimed at its needs in ways that a 
large multi-use platform cannot. For example, Facebook groups have been 
used by political activists to organize and patient groups to support one an-
other, but the platform fails to meet either of their privacy needs.
134
Both 
groups started on Facebook to reach the largest number of people, but now, 
platforms may exist that better meet their needs, especially if growth is no
longer their main priority. Some groups may be so large that competitors 
would even build new products specifically tailored to them if only they 
could access the data. Collective portability is thus necessary to give groups 
the same kind of choice afforded to individuals.
135
133. For example, Wikitribune, Ello, and Vero are all social media platforms that surged 
in popularity in response to different Facebook scandals. They all had waitlists when they first 
launched because they could not handle the scale of user interest, but all failed to maintain 
that level of growth, potentially because too few people were on them.
134. See generally Madelyn Rose Sanfilippo & Katherine J. Strandburg, Privacy Gov-
erning Knowledge in Public Facebook Groups for Political Activism, INFO., COMMC’N &
SOC’Y (Sept. 26, 2019), https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/1369118X.2019.
1668458; United States v. Facebook, Inc., No. 1:19-CV-2184 (D.D.C. July 24, 2019) (stipu-
lated order), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/182_3109_facebook_
order_filed_7-24-19.pdf.
135. Collective portability cannot address the unique speed of data access, aka “now-
casting”, because there is only a one-time connection between the data sender and receiver, 
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3. Economies of Scale
Collective portability better addresses economies of scale than other 
approaches to data portability because it allows for more data and more us-
ers to move over at once. This helps competing platforms reach a similar 
scale to incumbents more quickly.
136
It also allows for scale without threat-
ening privacy, as LinkedIn’s contact scraping did, or compromising utility 
to competitors, as Facebook’s DYI tool does. Additionally, when a collec-
tive agrees to move their data together, less data falls between the cracks as 
it would with individual users moving with their own one-off exports.
4. Network Effects
Collective portability aligns closely with the catalytic strategies Evans 
recommends for overcoming network effects.
137
According to his frame-
work, platforms create value by bringing distinct economic agents together 
and reducing the transaction costs of them finding one another, and new en-
trants to the market can only get the economic agents they need to kickstart 
growth by onboarding large chunks of users at once. Collective portability 
does exactly that. And for some platforms, such as messaging platforms, a 
few strong network connections may create network effects as powerful as 
many weaker connections.
D. Challenges to Collective Portability
Collective portability has some distinct advantages over current one-
user-at-a-time portability approaches like one-off exports and APIs. How-
ever, regulation and implementation of collective portability, beyond being 
difficult, threatens to exacerbate other problems faced by the tech industry. 
Platforms may also resist collective portability for reasons that relate to 
competition and otherwise. Some of the obstacles collective portability may 
face are discussed below.
138
not an ongoing connection where timely information gets sent back and forth. See STUCKE &
GRUNES, supra note 64, at 8.
136. It may also not take having the same amount of data to compete. There are eventu-
ally diminishing returns on the amount of data and the features of the algorithm itself super-
seded. See generally Xinran He et al., Practical Lessons from Predicting Clicks on Ads at Fa-
cebook, FACEBOOK RSCH. (Aug. 24, 2014), https://research.fb.com/publications/practical-
lessons-from-predicting-clicks-on-ads-at-facebook.
137. See generally EVANS, supra note 86.
138. See Mike Masnick, Protocols, Not Platforms: A Technological Approach to Free 
Speech, KNIGHT FIRST AMENDMENT INST., COLUM. UNIV. (Aug. 21, 2019), https:/
/knightcolumbia.org/content/protocols-not-platforms-a-technological-approach-to-free-
speech. These problems are the same as the ones in Masnick’s approach to platform free 
speech and competition. The two proposals are very different, but both involve making it easi-
er to move data around.
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1. Implementation Complexity
Platforms may have a difficult time implementing collective portability 
regimes, which in turn may lead to complex designs that users do not readi-
ly adopt. Some platforms may have difficulty determining which users or 
what data constitute a collective. Users may have different gradations of 
control over certain data (e.g., a Google Doc can have owners, editors, 
commenters, and viewers) and ownership is not always exactly clear (e.g., if 
a Twitter user quotes another user’s public tweet, is that tweet now a part of 
his data?).
139
Governance mechanisms can also be difficult to design, especially for 
large communities in which the choice to change platforms will most likely 
not be unanimous. Additional normative and technical questions arise for 
groups and platforms that were built before implementing collective porta-
bility. Only platforms that build collective portability in from the beginning 
can set rules at the time users sign up for a group or platform. If the rules 
determining which data gets sent are too complicated or not transparent 
enough, new market entrants will be hesitant to invest in integrating with it, 
leaving users with nowhere to bring their data.
2. Incumbent Resistance
Currently dominant platforms are likely uninterested in implementing 
collective portability since they may see it as sabotaging their own busi-
nesses. Collective portability is in some sense a zero-sum game with plat-
forms vying for the same users, data, and attention.
140
In this respect, large 
platforms have more to lose, particularly when entire groups can move at 
once, meaning they may actively resist collective portability. Platforms may 
also not want to take responsibility for answering the hairy questions about 
how to send data, especially if the process upsets some users or requires 
significant investment in resources Platform resistance would thereby put 
the onus on regulators to design competition-inducing collective portability 
standards, and they might not have the technical knowhow to do so effec-
tively.
Collective portability may more broadly run counter to the way that 
large technology firms conceptualize their platforms and design policy for 
their users. For example, Facebook sets rules for its users by following sig-
nals from individual actors (users and organizations).
141
Collective portabil-
139. Twitter says, yes. When I downloaded my Twitter data, I got other people’s re-
tweets, including their pictures.
140. It is too speculative to say that collective portability would increase the number of 
users on the Internet or the amount of time they spend on multi-sided platforms.
141. See Matthias C. Kettemann & Wolfgang Schulz, Setting Rules for 2.7 Billion. A 
(First) Look into Facebook’s Norm-Making Systems: Results of a Pilot Study (Working Pa-
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ity would require a paradigm shift in Facebook’s approach to public policy 
to address the needs of pluralities rather than individuals.
3. Content Moderation and Filter Bubbles
If users can easily organize and move their data from one platform to 
another en masse, de-platforming could become more difficult. It could 
make it easier for hate speech and other normatively undesirable behavior to 
regrow on a new platform when stomped out on another. This dynamic has 
played out on a smaller scale between Reddit, a news aggregator and social 
network, and Voat, an almost identical service. In 2015, Reddit closed down 
five of its communities (or “subreddits”) for harassment, including 
r/FatPeopleHate with 150,000 members.
142
A controversy over free speech 
on the platform broke out and some moved to Voat, then run by a two per-
son team, where they restarted some of the closed communities.
143
Voat’s
FatPeopleHate group at one point had 18,700 members.
144
A similar story 
played out with the far right, pro-Trump r/The_Donald subreddit, which was 
banned in June 2020 for abuse and hate speech.
145
The community had am-
ple warning before the ban and had largely abandoned the subreddit months 
earlier
146
in favor of a homegrown Reddit clone called TheDonald.win, 
which is even more popular than Voat.
147
If Reddit had collective portability, it could have made the migration of 
r/FatePeopleHate or r/The_Donald even easier, potentially allowing them to 
migrate more users and keep the historical content they were banned for. 
Furthermore, if Reddit knew that hateful communities could easily reconsti-
tute on new platforms, it may have been less incentivized to remove these 
communities in the first place under the logic of “if we don’t host them 
pers of the Hans-Bredow-Institut, Work in Progress # 1), https://leibniz-hbi.de/uploads/media
/default/cms/media/1soch5s_AP_WiP001InsideFacebook.pdf.
142. See Emma Woollacott, Users Flock to Voat as Reddit Shuts Harassing Groups,
FORBES (June 11, 2015, 7:51 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/emmawoollacott/2015/06/11
/users-flock-to-voat-as-reddit-shuts-harassing-groups.
143. See Adi Robertson, Welcome to Voat: Reddit Killer, Troll Haven, and the Strange 
Face of Internet Free Speech, VERGE (July 10, 2015, 9:11 AM), https://www.theverge.com
/2015/7/10/8924415/voat-reddit-competitor-free-speech.
144. Id.
145. See Bobby Alynn, Reddit Bans The_Donald, Forum of Nearly 800,000 Trump 
Fans, over Abusive Posts, NPR (June 29, 2020, 5:10 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/29
/884819923/reddit-bans-the_donald-forum-of-nearly-800-000-trump-fans-over-abusive-posts.
146. Reddit’s usage statistics show the page had on average only 7,780 daily active users 
at the time. Elizabeth Culliford & Katie Paul, Reddit Bans ‘The_Donald’ Forum Amid Broad 
Social Media Crackdown, REUTERS (June 29, 2020, 1:50 PM), https://www.reuters.com
/article/us-reddit-trump/reddit-bans-thedonald-forum-amid-broad-social-media-crackdown-
idUSKBN2402K7.
147. See Sarah Emerson, Months Before Reddit Purge, The_Donald Users Created a 
New Home, ONEZERO (July 2, 2020), https://onezero.medium.com/months-before-reddit-
purge-the-donald-users-created-a-new-home-a732f79e4f04.
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someone else will.” Frictionless ideology-based migration could also in-
crease filter bubbles
148
by making it easier for groups with shared ideologies 
to flock to the same platform and isolate themselves from other ideas.
The capacity to deplatform remains normatively ambivalent. Forums 
like 8chan, a site linked to multiple mass shootings known for harboring 
white supremacism and anti-Semitism, should obviously be able to be de-
platformed, as should safe harbors for child pornography and terrorist ac-
tivity. However, deplatforming raises free speech concerns,
149
such as when 
Alex Jones was banned from YouTube and Facebook, seriously diminishing 
traffic to his show “Infowars.”
150
The extent to which collective portability 
allows for certain kinds of deplatforming depends on specific choices in im-
plementation.
CONCLUSION
Data portability as it exists today has yet to demonstrate that it can im-
prove competition in the tech sector. The GDPR has required platforms to 
allow users to download their personal data since 2018, yet no meaningful 
competitors have emerged from this effort. Successful predecessors to plat-
form data portability, such as mobile number portability, only alleviated 
switching costs; new multi-sided platforms hoping to enter the market face 
additional barriers. Since data on an incumbent platform is mostly useful in 
the context of other users, one person porting their data in isolation is often 
insufficient to bootstrap competitors.
Collective portability addresses market barriers to entry beyond switch-
ing costs. It allows users to coordinate to transfer their data with others and 
maintain the context it was used in, assuring competitors that they can use it 
for the same purpose. This may be an appealing tool for regulators hoping to 
improve platform competition, even if it comes with its own challenges 
around governance, content moderation, and industry buy-in.
What might good collective portability regulation look like? First, it 
would be entirely separate from data portability regulation aimed at giving 
users better control over their data. Singapore set a precedent for this in 
forthcoming amendments to its Personal Data Protection Act, which sepa-
rate out the competition and data control aims of data portability into two 
148. See generally ELI PARISER, THE FILTER BUBBLE: WHAT THE INTERNET IS HIDING 
FROM YOU (2011).
149. See Jonah Goldberg, Deplatform on Social Media and Free Speech, NAT’L REV.
(May 13, 2019, 5:19 PM), https://www.nationalreview.com/corner/deplatforming-on-social-
media-and-free-speech.
150. See Jack Nicas, Alex Jones Said Bans Would Strengthen Him. He Was Wrong.,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/04/technology/alex-jones-
infowars-bans-traffic.html.
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separate rights, the Data Portability Obligation
151
and the Access Obliga-
tion.
152
Second, it would differentiate between small, new market entrants 
and large incumbents. This prevents users and data from further concentrat-
ing on large platforms with strong network effects while also relieving un-
der-resourced startups from excessive technical burden. Third, the regula-
tion would create explicit carve outs for when portable user data overlaps. 
The GDPR states that if personal data overlaps between two or more data 
subjects, privacy and deletion rights supersede portability rights, potentially 
leaving none of the data subjects able to port it. A collective portability ver-
sion of this policy would provide that if the data subjects were part of some 
closed off group, the platform should make it possible for all relevant data 
subjects to consent to a transfer or export.
151. See SINGAPORE PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION COMMISSION, RESPONSE TO 
FEEDBACK ON THE PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON PROPOSED DATA PORTABILITY AND DATA 
INNOVATION PROVISIONS 5 (2020), https://www.pdpc.gov.sg/-/media/Files/PDPC/PDF-Files
/Legislation-and-Guidelines/Response-to-Feedback-for-3rd-Public-Consultation-on-Data-
Portability-Innovation-200120.pdf. The Data Portability Obligation is intended “to facilitate 
movement of consumer data from one service provider to another, so that consumers are bet-
ter empowered to try out or move to new or competing service offerings.” It requires data con-
trollers to transmit data in a machine-readable format directly to another controller if so re-
quested.
152. Id. The Access Obligation “is intended to allow individuals to access and verify 
their personal data in an organisation’s possession or under its control, and how their personal 
data has been used by the organisation.”
